Core Faculty : Full-time
Contact address :
ULB zipcode : 114/04
Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50
Candidate in Physics (ULB, 1994), M.Sc. Business Engineer (ULB 1994), M.Phil. Economics (Cambridge, 1995), Ph.D. Economics (Harvard, 2000)
Estelle Cantillon is a FNRS research associate at the Solvay Brussels School where she teaches environmental economics in the MA programmes and advises doctoral students in market design, industrial organisation, and environmental economics. Her research lies at the boundary between market design and industrial organization. She has published on auctions, procurement and competition in the financial industry. Her current research spans school choice, competition in the financial industry and environmental market design.
Estelle is an elected member of the Council of the European Economic Association, a member of the executive committee of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, an Associate Editor at the Rand Journal of Economics, a member of the Economics Council of OXERA, a consultancy, and a member of the steering committee of Re-Bel (Rethinking Belgium). She has recently launched a European-wide research network, "Matching in Practice", whose goal is to foster developments at the interface between theory, empirics, experiments and policy on admission procedures in education as well as entry-labor markets.
Estelle holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University and has held prior appointments at Yale University and Harvard Business School before joining the faculty at the Solvay Brussels School in 2004. In 2008, she received one of the coveted starting grants from the European Research Council.
Budish, E., & Cantillon, E. (2012, June 01). The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. The American economic review.
Cantillon, E., & Yin, P.-L. (2011, May). Competition between Exchanges: A research Agenda. International journal of industrial organization, 29, 329-336.
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2010). Procurement when Price and Quality Matter. The Rand journal of economics, 41(1), 1-34.
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2008). Properties of scoring auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 69-85.
Cantillon, E. (2008, January). The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 1-25.
Arozamena, L., & Cantillon, E. (2004, January). Investment incentives in procurement auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(1), 1-18.